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Abstract 
Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace 
industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) to meet the 
energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands 
and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth 
orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external 
environment threats like naturally occurring micrometeoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these 
solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible 
to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD motivating a study into the failure consequences to 
the ISS. This paper documents the different failure modes for these two types of batteries under hypervelocity impact and the 
implications for spacecraft survivability when shielding is breached. 
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1. Introduction 
Thermal runaway events have been experienced in terrestrial applications of the Li-Ion battery, and have been 
known to cause a fire that has the potential to spread to neighboring cells [1-3]. However, many aspects of the impact 
threat at ISS differ significantly from terrestrial failure scenarios requiring additional studies relevant to the ISS 
environment. Among the major differences is the configuration that is required for operation in space, the absence of 
an atmosphere and the impact speeds are far higher at the ISS. Owing to these differences, Li-Ion battery cells, that 
are representative of those selected for operation on the ISS, have been studied under conditions approximating orbital 
impacts.  
As a basis of comparison of risk and as a result of the continued deployment, the predecessor nickel-hydrogen (Ni-
H2) cells have also been considered under similar conditions. For both types of cells, the representative shielding 
surrounding the battery pack is overwhelmed under the experimental impact conditions. This study has been directed 
by the NASA Johnson Space Center’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group for the International Space 
Station program office and the Boeing Company and performed at the 12.7 mm and 25.4 mm, two-stage, light-gas 
guns at the Remote Hypervelocity Test Laboratory in NASA Johnson Space Center’s White Sands Test Facility, Las 
Cruces, NM. 
2. Ni-H2 Impact Experiments 
An 81 A-hr, Ni-H2 impact study has been performed on a legacy configuration of the ISS orbital replacement unit 
(ORU) battery assembly as shown in Fig. 1a. The experimental configuration of the ORU battery assembly in the test 
chamber is shown in Fig. 1b. This configuration is typical of the deployed ISS configuration and consists of thirty-
eight cylindrical battery cells contained in a protective enclosure. The Ni-H2 battery cells are constructed from Inconel 
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718 with minimum thicknesses in the cylinder of 0.8 mm and the dome of 0.65 mm. These Ni-H2 batteries will 
continue to be deployed on the outside of the ISS even after they have been functionally replaced by the Li-Ion 
batteries; therefore, they represent a continued safety consideration for the ISS. 
 
Fig. 1. (a) ISS Ni-H2 battery ORU and (b) ORU subassembly with enclosure open. 
The Ni-H2 cell generates hydrogen gas in the free cell volume resulting from the chemical reactions that occur 
during charging, and in this design, the hydrogen accumulates up to a design pressure of 6 MPa, which indicates 100% 
state of charge (SOC) for the rated 81 ampere-hour (Ah). At this operational pressure, the designed burst factor for 
this cell is about six, and the cell casing is designed to leak before burst. In addition to the hydrogen gas, the cells also 
contain an aqueous potassium hydroxide (KOH) electrolyte solution. Because of this construction, two ISS safety 
concerns arise upon the failure of a cell due to impact: ejected fluids could react with materials around the cell and the 
impulsive nature of an impact could induce a fragmentation event rather than a leak. To address these concerns, an 
impact study has been performed to determine the failure mechanism for the Ni-H2 cell after penetration and to assess 
if there are any adverse reactions with the electrolyte materials, thermal events or cascade failure responses. 
To create a realistic impact scenario and containment environment, the studied Ni-H2 cells are arranged and 
connected just as they are in operation and contained in a representative enclosure as seen in Fig. 1b. The cells are 
arranged on a square grid within the enclosure with an intercell separation of 25.4 mm. The cells are electrically 
connected to each other by aluminum bus bars attached between the cell terminals alternating between the top and 
bottom domes. The enclosure surrounding the cells consists of an aluminum honeycomb panel with 0.4 mm facesheets 
separated by a 12.7 mm thick honeycomb that is covered by a multi-layer insulation blanket (0.086 g/cm2). The 
minimum separation between the enclosure and a cell is nominally 33 mm. The top of the enclosure is 38 mm from 
the top of the dome, and the bottom of the enclosure is a large structural plate that is not consider a credible threat 
direction. 
The Ni-H2 impact conditions are summarized in Table 1. These experiments impacted through the enclosure, and 
have been targeted to consider three basic locations on the Ni-H2 battery: in the dome, into the terminals on the top of 
the domes, and into the side. Various aluminum, Al2017-T4, and steel, SS440C, projectile diameters have been used 
in this study, at impact speeds of 7 km/s and impact angles of 0° and 45° to the normal of the honeycomb panel. None 
of the experiments resulted in fragmentation of the cells. No thermal events or cascading failures resulted in the loss 
of neighboring cells.  The largest perforations are shown in Fig. 2a (HITF13144) and Fig. 2b (HITF13165). Generally, 
the response to cell perforation is that the Ni-H2 cell vents and the voltage across the terminals declines until the cell 
could no longer maintain current over a load. In one case, the battery box cover deformed because the venting of the 
cell occurred so quickly that the pressure in the enclosure permanently deformed the cover. 
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                              Table 1. Ni-H2 impact conditions with Al2017-T4 except where indicated. 
Experiment # Impact 
Location 
Projectile 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Impact 
Obliquity 
(°) 
Impact 
Speed 
(km/s) 
Cell Damage 
Summary 
(mm) 
HITF13144 Dome 5.0 0 6.66 11.5 x 10.0 Perforation 
HITF13145 Dome 4.0 0 6.86 1.0 x 1.5 Perforation 
HITF13146 Dome 3.8 0 7.09 1.5 x 2.4 Perforation 
HITF13147 Dome 3.4 0 7.09 2.4 x 3.5 Perforation 
HITF13148 Dome 3.0 0 7.00 2.5 x 1.5 Perforation 
HITF13149 Dome 2.8 0 7.19 No Perforation 
HITF13151 Terminal 2.9 0 7.19 No Perforation 
HITF13152 Terminal 3.1 0 7.12 No Perforation 
HITF13153 Terminal 3.3 0 6.85 No Perforation 
HITF13154 Terminal 4.2 45 7.13 1.6 x 1.2 Perforation 
HITF13155 Terminal 3.0* 45 7.00 1.5 x 1.5 Perforation 
HITF13158 Dome 5.0 45 7.13 2.0 x 2.0 Perforation 
HITF13159 Dome 4.0 45 7.00 No Perforation 
HITF13160 Dome 4.2 45 7.07 1.8 x 08 Perforation 
HITF13162 Terminal 5.0 0 7.05 7.5 x 7.0 Perforation 
HITF13163 Terminal 4.8 0 7.07 No Perforation 
HITF13164 Terminal 5.1 0 7.04 3.0 x 1.0 Perforation 
HITF13165 Terminal 3.8* 0 6.87 18.0 x 8.0 Perforation 
HITF13174 Side 4.1 45 7.04 1.0 x 4.0 Perforation 
HITF13175 Side 3.9 45 7.04 No Perforation 
*SS440C steel projectiles 
 
Fig. 2. Most significant observed damage of the Ni-H2 cells (a) HITF13144 and (b) HITF13165. 
3. Li-Ion Impact Experiments 
An impact study of a 134 A-hr, Li-Ion cell, shown in Figure 3a, has been performed in a representative 
configuration of the ISS ORU as seen in Figure 3b. Similarly, an impact study has also been performed with the 72 
A-hr, Li-Ion cell, shown in Figure 3c, in its ISS representative configuration of the ISS ORU as seen in Figure 3d. 
Like the Ni-H2 cells, the Li-Ion cells are also contained in an aluminum honeycomb panel ORU box. The aluminum 
honeycomb panel is separated from the top of the Li-Ion cells by 91 mm for the 134 A-hr and 155 mm for the 134 A-
hr. The Li-Ion configuration also includes additional protective materials internal to the enclosure, which includes 19 
mm Solimide foam spacer followed by two sheets of Nextel 312 AF62 fabric. These protective materials are repeated 
with a total of 38 mm spacing foam and two sets of two Nextel sheets. These added shield materials increase the 
protection of the Li-Ion cells; thus, significantly decreasing the likelihood of failure of the cells from an impact. 
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Both the 134 A-hr and 72 A-hr Li-Ion cells are from standard construction practices for this type of cell [4]. The 
perforated separator, which prevents the shorting between the positive and negative electrode, can be damaged on 
perforation of the cell allowing a short circuit and rapid heating of the electrolyte which can then undergo exothermic 
reactions. The pressure from the heated material can then begin to expel molten material. Similarly, even without 
physical damage to the separator, very hot electrolyte can also start undergoing exothermic reactions. The reaction 
continues to heat the cell further raising the temperature of the cell, which in turn raises the pressure within the cell. 
When this “thermal runaway” is initiated a built-in relief mechanism in the cell casing releases pressure and molten 
material escapes directionally rather than allowing the cell to undergo a fragmentation event. These failure scenarios 
give rise to safety critical conditions for the ISS: ejected molten material in the wrong direction could pose a hazard 
to neighboring cells or structures, many cells may experience thermal runaway significantly heating surrounding ISS 
structures, and if the impact creates a scenario where the safety mechanism does not release pressure, a fragmentation 
event could occur. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Representative ISS Li-Ion a) 134 A-hr cell schematic and its b) experimental configuration, and c) 72 A-hr cell schematic and its d) 
experimental configuration. 
To address these concerns, a series of hypervelocity impact conditions have been considered for the two cells and 
are summarized in Table 1. Each experimental article used two separate Li-Ion battery cells, but only one cell has 
been targeted. A second cell is included to determine if failure can propagate to a nearby undamaged cell. The two 
cells are arranged as they are expected to be arranged in flight with a separator of 1.6 mm 6063 aluminum.  
            Table 2. Li-Ion cell impact conditions. 
a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
 
Experiment /  
Cell Type 
Impact 
Location 
Projectile 
Diameter 
(mm) 
Impact 
Obliquity 
(°) 
Impact 
Speed 
(km/s) 
Cell Damage 
Summary 
HITF12143 
134 A-hr Terminal 10.0 0 6.86 
Primary cell-Perforated, peak of 184°C 
Secondary cell-No ignition or thermal runaway 
HITF12144 
72 A-hr Terminal 10.0 0 7.02 
Primary cell-Perforated, peak of 194°C 
Secondary cell- Thermal runaway peaking at 531°C 
HITF12145 
134 A-hr Side 10.0 30 7.05 
Primary cell-No Perforation 
Secondary cell-No Perforation 
HITF12146 
72 A-hr Side 10.0 30 7.02 
Primary cell-No Perforation 
Secondary cell-No Perforation 
HITF12147 
134 A-hr Side 13.5 45 6.88 
Primary cell-Perforated, peak of 193°C 
Secondary cell- Thermal runaway peaking at 315°C 
HITF12148 
134 A-hr Terminal 10.0 0 7.19 
Primary cell-Perforated, no ignition 
Secondary cell-No thermal runaway 
 
The impact locations are typically at the terminal end of the battery cells, although, some shots to the side of the 
Li-Ion battery have also been performed. Both cell configurations demonstrated similar failure results. When 
penetrated, the impacted Li-Ion battery typically increases in temperature while the cell contents are ejected. The 
neighboring cell will in most cases increase in temperature, but only occasionally will the temperature increase 
substantially and result in failure of the undamaged cell. An example of such a cascade is shown in Fig. 4 of a sequence 
of images of the Li-Ion battery response from HITF12143. The first three frames are on one second intervals, and the 
remaining five frames are on two second intervals. As can be seen, this experiment resulted in a visible deflagration 
as the impacted cell contents are energetically ejected over several seconds following cell penetration.  
 
 Fig. 4. HITF12143 visible video frames at 1s and then 2s intervals after impact. 
The aluminium honeycomb panel in front of the cell, Figure 5a, was severely melted due to the expelled cell 
material; however, the neighbouring cell did not transition into thermal runaway in this impact experiment. Whenever 
a cells contents eject, significant quantities of metallic flakes are formed following cooling of the molten material as 
seen in Figure 5b with similar metallic flakes spread throughout the target chamber. These flakes would contribute to 
the orbital debris environment in an operational environment release. 
  
  
  
 
 Fig. 5. HITF12143 damage photography of a) representative enclosure and b) ejected cell material that remained with the cell. 
4. Conclusions 
The use of rechargeable batteries in orbital spaceflight requires consideration of the uncontrolled energy release 
from a cell, which is dependent on the type of cell. Impact experiments have evaluated the failure mechanisms of the 
fully charged Ni-H2 battery cell and Li-Ion battery cell. For the operational design of the Ni-H2 battery like those used 
on the ISS, the hydrogen gas will vent on perforation of the battery vessel; but unusual thermal events or catastrophic 
rupture did not occur. The ISS Ni-H2 battery cells have a relatively high burst factor of 6. When pressurized battery 
cells are used in other spacecraft, attention to the burst factor of the cell should be taken into account. 
Impact experiments on Li-Ion battery cells demonstrated an energetic release when shielding is overmatched and 
the cell is penetrated. The impacted cell will typically overheat and will vent/eject the internal contents of the cell, 
including molten metal, rapidly after impact (within a few seconds). In some cases, the venting material will auto-
ignite, even in the vacuum environment of the test chamber. Depending on the design of the battery cell enclosure, 
neighboring Li-Ion cells can also experience increases in temperature and can fail due to thermal runaway. 
Shielding for batteries should be selected based upon the type of cell to be protected, typical failure modes and the 
acceptability for loss of battery cells. Supplemental shielding for Li-Ion batteries should be designed to meet 
survivability requirements without allowing perforation of the cell wall. Shield and battery designs should be verified 
by test to ensure they meet protection requirements. 
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